Abstract-Deploying an XMPP server requires system security configuration, including firewalls and XMPP security controls.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [3] is an open standard originally created by the Jabber com munity for instant messaging and presence and has evolved to support a much wider range of other services such multi-party chat, voice and video calls. An XMPP server may be config ured to support host-based security controls. For example, an IP address white-list may specify the other XMPP servers with which a server may be willing to federate. The XMPP protocol supports different authentication methods, including simple password-based, dial-back and TLS-based authentication. In addition to server-to-server configuration, server to client sys tem connections can be configured. Individual XMPP servers also support, to varying degrees, specific configuration options for application-level security controls whereby mediation is based on application-level content. For example, the Openfire XMPP server packet-filter and content-filter plug-ins provide user-to-user access controls and message filtering of message content based on regular-expressions.
The XMPP server administrator is responsible for ensuring that their system configuration adequately defends against ap propriate threats. For example, the administrator of a corporate XMPP server may require that clients and servers connect only via TLS in order to mitigate DNS spoofing, while dial-back server authentication is an adequate mitigation is considered adequate for a public/free service. An administrator might also use a white-list to ensure that only organizations with business agreements are permitted to federate and connect with the server. In deciding whether the XMPP server of another organization should be added to the white-list, the administrator may require that the server of the other orga nization is adequately configured; for example, that it has adequate 1M SPAM (SPIM) and Denial of Service controls in place. The XMPP standards foundation [3] provide some recommended best practices for secure configuration, such as XEP-0205 (Denial of Service), XEP-Ol78 (authentication) XEP-0165 (lID Mimicking) and XEP-0159 (SPIM).
We are interested in providing a degree of autonomic configuration support for the XMPP administrator. Rather than operating directly on the configuration, the administrator creates a business policy that defines the conditions under which the XMPP configuration may be changed. An auto mated agent running on an XMPP server, on behalf of the administrator, accepts configuration change-requests, and if the request is permitted by the policy then the agent updates the configuration. In the simplest case, the request originates from the administrator and the agent ensures that the resulting configuration is at least consistent with the current business policy. In the more general case, the request may originate from some third party, for example, the user of another server requesting federation. In this case, the agent must determine whether the high-level policy indicates that it can trust the originator, for example, that a business-agreement is in place and may update the white-list. This request should be acted on by the automated agent without requiring intervention of the administrator. This paper describes the design and implementation of an agent service that, subject to a policy, can update an XMPP server configuration based on third-party requests. The KeyNote Trust Management system [4] provides the policy framework and is used to manage the trust relationships between the administrator and third-parties. An advantage of taking a Trust Management approach is that it does not necessarily rely on a centralized authorization/policy service and the policy rules can be distributed across the network. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Trust Management. Section 3 outlines the architecture and design of the XMPP configuration agent. Sections 4 and 5 explores how the agent might be used in practice by presenting a series of sample policies. Section 6 outlines the current implementation of the agent in the Open fire XMPP server.
II. TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Trust Management [6] is an approach to constructing and interpreting the trust relationships among public keys that are used to mediate security critical actions. Cryptographic 978-1-4244-9221-31111$26.00 ©2011 IEEEcredentials specify delegation of authorisation between public keys. When a request from an untrusted principle (key) is made to a networked application to execute a particular action, then, authentication notwithstanding, the application must determine whether the key(s) that made the request is authorised. Trust Management provides assistance to applications in making these decisions and facilitates decentralized policies: autho rization may be determined without having to consult some central authorisation server, and users may further delegate their authority without reference to a Central Authority.
KeyNote [4] is a flexible trust management scheme that provides a simple credential notation for expressing both security policies and delegation. Authorisation comes in the form of digitally signed public key credentials that bind public keys to the authorisation to perform various actions. For example, Sally may hold a credential, signed by her manager's private key, binding her public key to her authorisation to capture deals up to a value of £100.00. Sally's public key signs an order request to the purchasing application; her credential provides proof of authorisation.
In practice, authorisation is achieved by a collection of credentials that exhibit the necessary trust relationships be tween their keys. For example, we may trust Sally's public key for orders up to £100.00 if her manager's public key is trusted to delegate orders up to £100.00 (or more), and so forth along a delegation chain that ends in a key that is known to be appropriately trusted. Given a policy (public keys, trusted in known ways), and a collection of credentials, a network application must determine whether a particular public key is authorised to request a particular operation. KeyNote has been used to provide trust management for applications including active networks [5] and web servers [1] . Figure 1 depicts use of the XMPP agent. The goal of the Federated Autonomic Configuration (FAC) agent is to provide an orchestrated security configuration service for a secure XMPP service. This includes host-level controls via XMPP server-server and server-client configuration, application-level controls, for example, packet and content filtering controls and other security controls such as firewalls whose policies must be aligned with the XMPP policies. The current prototype is limited to host-based XMPP configuration controls and is intended to provide a proof of concept for the more general approach, which is a topic for future research.
III. MANAGING XMPP CONFIGURATIONS USING KEyNOTE TRUST MANAGEMENT

A. Agent Behavior
A Target server with IP address T and public key KT hosts a FAC agent and an XMPP server. The target server has a KeyNote policy that specifies the conditions under which it is willing to trust a request. A Requestor with public key KR sends a signed request (to federate with XMPP server at address R) to T. This is done by including the address of the server that hosts the requester XMPP service in the request 
C. Delegation Credentials
Suppose that the Target administrator trusts the administra The Target administrator issues a credential stating that XMPP security audits from a SecurityConsultant are trusted: Using these credentials, Bob can make a (successful) request to the Target FAC agent to federate with Bob's XMPP server.
V. EXAMPLE: BUSINESS LEVEL FEDERATION
A FAC agent can mediate white-list modification based on any KeyNote policy. This policymay be based on organiza tional or business requirements. For example, a business has two types of business agreements: b2b roles, which correspond to business-to-business agreements and b2c roles which cor respond to a business-to-customer agreement. The business has a policy that any individual involved in a b2b agreement may federate XMPP and ERP services, while b2c agreements are limited to XMPP services. This policy is specified as follows, where TargetAdmin corresponds to the public key of the system administrator of the business. The system administrator issues a credential to the director of the business indicating that he/she is unconditionally trusted. 
VI. IMPLEMEN T ATION
The FAC agent has been implemented to support configura tion management of an Openfire XMPP server and comprises three components: an Agent Server, an Openfire Agent plugin and an Agent Client plugin.
The Agent Client Plugin generates a request to a remote target FAC agent. Currently, it provides a simple user-interface that allows a user to manually select the request and credentials to be sent to the server. We are investigating how this can be done automatically whereby a failure response to an XMPP connection attempt is trapped and generates a request to the corresponding FAC agent at the target and is, in turn, followed by a repeated connection attempt.
The Agent Server sits alongside the XMPP server waiting for connections from Agent clients. A request from a client is interpreted as a KeyNote query and the result is passed back to the agent which takes the appropriate action. If the requester is authorised then the Agent will dispatch a configuration change to to Open fire FAC Agent plugin.
The Openjire FAC Agent plug in acts on (trusted) requests from the FAC Agent Server. The current prototype provides support for Openfire whitelist update and addition of packet filter rules.
Openfire configuration updates by a FAC Agent are tem porary and expire after a ValidityPeriod, which can be specified in the policy and/or delegation credentials.
VII. DISCUSSION
This paper describes an agent that automates configuration management of an XMPP server. The current implementation is limited to policies involving host and user based controls, that is, white-list configuration and user/group based packet filtering. We are investigating how this agent may be extended to include other policy attributes. For example, support for at tributes: Authentication specifying server authentication configuration options (none, password, dialback, TLS, etc.), and Content_F il ter specifying a regular-expression to be added to the the Openfire content filter rules for blocking text. The agent will be extended to coordinate configuration with other security controls, such as firewall configuration [7] . This goes beyond the firewall-centric approach described in [8] .
The FAC agent currently operates independently of the Openfire server where requests are made by a user via a simple user interface. Future research will investigate how requests can be made transparently (to the requesting user): on being denied a connection to a target service, the requester (XMPP server) requests a configuration change to the target FAC.
